



THE CONCEPT OF WIZARAT IN MAWARDI AND NIZAMUL MULK TUSI

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR
M. PHIL. DEGREE


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CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH

1983



DS494

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t

I feel great pleasure in expressing my deep gratitude to my supervisor Mr. M. A. Alavi, Reader, Department of History whose painstaking guidance enabled me to complete the present scheme of research. Despite his pre-occupation in the cultural, literary and the extra-curricular activities, he very diligently devoted himself to supervise the work on hand and from the inner most core of my heart I am grateful to him for taking me under his supervision in a situation when the centripetal forces negatively worked hard to deprive me of further academic pursuits. His humanly qualities are numerous which often attract his students to develop personal intimacy and affinity with him.

It is also a great occasion to record here my deep obligation to Professor A. A. Rizami, who, apart from being the Chairman of the department, had for a long been a symbol of paternal affection for me and it is he who suggested me to take up this work.

I owe much thanks to Dr. Iasin Mazhar Siddiqui, Lecturer, Department of History, for allowing me to use the manuscript of his book which is still in press. He also translated some of the Arabic sources for me.

I am also thankful to Dr. Kafil Ahmad, Lecturer in the Department of Arabic to help me in reading Arabic sources and translating the book Adab-ul-Vazir. My obligations to Professor Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi and Professor Muhammad Aslam of Panjab University, Lahore, Dr. Mohammad Noor Nabi, Department of Philosophy for their valuable suggestions.

I am particularly thankful to Professor Irfan Habib, Professor R. C. Jaur, Dr. Shahabuddin Iraqi, my colleagues Messers Iqbal Ghani Khan, Muhammad Afzal Khan and other members of the department for their cooperation and assistance which they extended to me from time to time and also to Dr. Mohammad Umar, Mrs. Haider, Dr. J. M. Singh, Dr. Tariq Ahmad and Dr. Shahn Abdul Latif for their moral support.

I am indebted to the staff of the Library, Department of History especially to Mr. Jalal Abbas, Office staff of the Department and the hall of my

residence for their sincere cooperation.

My thanks are also due to my friends Messers Mahmood Ali, Kalbe Jawad, Muhammad Azam, Khadim Musain, Satya Prakash, Dr. Rasaddul Musain for their friendly help.

I fail to find words to express my thanks to my friends Mr. Nasiruddin, Mr. Muzzamilullah Khan, Mr. Mohammad Yusuf Siddiqui, Mr. S. Ali Ahmad Naqvi for their moral and material help; it is Mr. Nasiruddin who serves as one of the five senses of the body and whose need is always greatly felt in every sphere of my life, being a natural handicap, and it is Mr. Khan who has voluntarily taken up the pains of typing out the entire manuscript.

And finally, I will always cherish a grateful and happy memory of the kindness, affection and encouragement of my mother, the other family members and the teachers of my primary education particularly Mr. Nasrullah Khan who substantially contributed to the development of all sorts of my mental facilities.

(AHMED NABAN)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NUMBERS	CHAPTERS	PAGES
	INTRODUCTION	
1.	THE BACKGROUND	1
2.	THE CONCEPT OF VIZARAT	39
3.	CONCLUSION	74
4.	BIBLIOGRAPHY	85
5.	APPENDIX -I	97
6.	APPENDIX-II	100

INTRODUCTION

Histories of political philosophy have been invariably written in the light of the philosophies of history pre-supposed by their authors. The result of this has been that errors vitiating their philosophies of history have crept into and marred their histories of political philosophy. In the present work an effort has been made to steer clear of these errors.

Treatment of the subject by Harun Khan Sherwani is simple and purely narrative. Qamaruddin Khan in his paper involves himself in a futile discussion whether any of the works of al-Mawardi was published during his life time, consequently the report of Ibn-i-Khalikan stands untrue; and that Abu Yala had no personal contact with Mawardi. Faizul Hasan Fayzee while looking into the works of Nizamulmulk expresses his doubts about the attribution of Siyasat Nama to him. Dr. S. Rizwan Ali Rizvi appears to have no knowledge of Persian or Arabic language. While writing his article on life and times of Nizamulmulk Tusi, he gives no description of political philosophy of Nizamulmulk and his paper is a collection of facts based on secondary sources. A. A. Kanpuri, an Urdu writer has no idea of political philosophy and therefore

limits himself to the narrative study of the life and works of Nizamulmulk Tusi. Above all none of them has dealt with the concept of vizierate, developed by the scholars under review, with which we are exclusively concerned.

Thus, one of the chief aims of this work is to give an idea neither of Muslim culture nor of political history, but only of one aspect of it, i.e., political philosophy in general and the concept of vizierate in particular during eleventh century of the Christian era.

Qamaruddin's argument stands untrue; because Abu Yala and Mawardi were simultaneously acting as advisor of law to the caliph (Qazi of harim) and qazi-al-sizat respectively. Both, being noted jurists, might have been together at the conference held in Baghdad sponsored by the caliph al-radir; in consequence to it Mawardi produced his Kitab-al-Iana, chiefly based on shafite principles of jurisprudence. Sir H. A. R. Gibb covers only one of the aspects of political philosophy of Mawardi, that is the concept of sovereignty which includes the Imamate and the Amirate. His comparison of Mawardi's thought with

that of al-Baghdadi is justifiable and stands to reason; for, Mawardi appears as a source of reference to all subsequent writers including Baghddadi. Sayzee's comprehension of the fact that Nizamulmulk could hardly find sufficient time to produce a work, and the presence of great scholars like Rajul Mulk and Sharful Mulk could not allow anyone especially Nizamulmulk to present a work as future constitution of the Seljuq state is not reasonable, because to the best of present knowledge, no work of these scholars is available so far. Nizamulmulk himself failed to present this work to Malikshah who had sponsored him. Nizamulmulk, while proceeding to Baghdad, handed over the rough draft of Siyasat Nama to official librarian, Mohammad Maghrafi for calligraphy, which initially contained thirty nine chapters and eleven more were added to it by an anonymous author later on, who had presumably been his close associate and was alive till the fall of Sark Yaruq.

Political philosophy of Mawardi is chiefly based on his treatises namely al-Ahkam-al-Sultaniya, which is a brief guideline to the caliph, vizier, Amir,

qazi and other administrative staff. The chief aim of this book was to give some ideas of political exigencies of the time which in turn demanded attention of the respective officers to their offices and corruptions therein. The adab-al-Vazir is guide line to the ministers and the sovereign, balance in various forces, with which he had to deal and avoidance of excess in virtues are the spirit of the work. The adab-al-qazi and nasihat-al-muluk contain brief guidelines to the justice and to the monarch respectively.

Mawardi and Nizamulmulk are not simply the representatives of their own times but they stand as founders of two different schools of political philosophy. Mawardi's school is of purely traditional nature aiming at to justify all sorts of active forces, working under the banner of Abbasid Caliph. This type of school, with slight deviations, was followed by Imam Ghazali, Ibn-Khaldun, Ibn-Timiyah, Shah Waliullah and many others, whereas the approach of Nizamulmulk was purely pragmatic in character. This school was followed by those who lived their lives in the monarchies, working within the fold of

persian customs, consequently Ziauddin Sarni and Abul Fazi presented a fine account of the political philosophy particularly the political theory of sovereignty.

Thus, it will not probably be improper, unjustified and subjective approach to disapprove of the trend of modern scholars who under the influence of European complex of superiority recognise Greeks, Italians and other scholars as the great political philosophers and neglect others despite the fact that even political thinkers like St. Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau have gone through and drawn on the works for their subject matter. Therefore, Muwardi and Nizamulmulk stand greater than the great political thinkers of European nation. An attempt has been made to provide sufficient ground to the posterity to think over this theme. It is also one of the objects of the present work to give proper place to each and everyone who had ever made any contribution to the subject. An objective approach and open mindedness is required therein. The contribution of European nation cannot altogether be ignored nor others can be relegated to the background of darkness.

The present work, consisting of two chapters, deals with the political philosophy of Hawardi and Nizamulmulk, with special reference to the concept of vizierate in the their writings. Here an attempt has been made to lighten a new path and to open up other vistas of researches for the scholars of history, political science and philosophy.

The sources are unfortunately scanty and not sufficient to furnish a detailed account of the mundane life of the lower strata of the society, or what was the impact of the influx of Turks, nomades and other sections of state on the social milieu of the past. The sources are also silent on the details of administration and corruption therein. It is also difficult to interpret such information as they give. Owing to a frequent lack of precision in the use of technical terms, it is not possible to obtain a clear picture of the characters of military adventures, sultans and their administrative staff. The achievements of the period have been attributed by many writers either to the sovereign or to the viziers particularly to Nizamulmulk Fusi. With the exception of Miskawahi's Ta'arib-al-Umam, no

contemporary source of the period of Buwayhid domination gives wholesome information of the forces subtrainiously working in different directions to perish the mother state. The period of the Saljuq is somewhat barren regarding contemporary historical material. The only exception was Anushervan bin Anaid whose approach, being an official, was bound to become little subjective towards Malikshah and Nizamulmulk.

It is, therefore, in a phase of severe deficiency of contemporary source material, but natural to rely upon the literature of later centuries which include Tabataba, Ibnul-Asir, Ibnul-Jauzi, Jutubi, Sundari, Al-Biyuti, Khwandmir, Fazlullah Rashidi, Ferishta, Haji Bairuddin and so on.

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

Every political organization pre-supposes the existence of a supreme administrative authority such as is connoted by the term Wizarat. Even as early as the time of Prophet Mohammad, when Arab polity was little more than a convenient system of tribal democracy, with chieftains wielding supreme powers over the lives and properties of the clansmen, someone was assigned the functions of implementing orders and policies. From amongst the nearest of the Prophet's companions some one could at any time be called upon to carry out decision for instance, diplomatic correspondence¹ was conducted by Muawiah.

1. Treaties were generally written down by Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Zaid bin Sabit, Abdullah bin Arqam used to write letters to foreign princes and to governors of the Islamic State. Muawiyah was engaged for writing down agreements (Muahida) between the Prophet and the Arabs. The name of Ubai bin K'ab is also mentioned in the list of Katibs. Al-Jahshyari, Kitab-al-wazra-wal-kutiba, pp. 12-14. Salazri, ansab-al-ashraf, V.I, p. 532.

In this capacity such outstanding persons as Abu Bakr, could well be said as performing the duties and functions of a vizier.¹

By the settlement reached between Ansar and the Mahajirin on the death of the Prophet, whereby the former were debarred from claims to the caliphate office, the Ansar received the office of Vizarat as their deserved reward.

The settlement was never implemented.² Distant provinces were placed under governors. The advisory functions were performed by Mallik-leshura; the executive functions were assigned to the secretaries of various departments.³

1. Prophet Mohammad used to seek advice from Abu Bakr in almost all matters. For it was this reason the Arabs called him as the Prophet's Vizier. Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam-al-Sultaniyah, p. 22.

The name of Abu Bakr is not included by any of the authors of the primary sources in the list of Katibs, See list in Al-Jahshyari and al-Balazari, op. cit., Ibne Jutayba-al-Ma-a-rif, pp. 138-41 and Taori Part II, pp. 836-43.

2. Al-Ahkam, p. 22.

3. Jahshyari and Taori consider Katib as the substitute title of vizier. Jahshyari, p. 19; Taori, V. II, pp. 836-84, and Haji Saifuddin, Athar-al-Muzra, pp. 22-29.

In all certainty the Umayyad Caliphs administered the state directly without any intermediary of the nature of vizier. With the entrance of Khalid Ibn Barmak, founder of the famous Barmak family, the vizarat institution can be said to have found its way into the Islamic administration. Khalid enjoyed the confidence and high esteem of Al-Mansur and he distinguished himself as counsellor and later head of finance department (Diwan-al-Kharaj) and governor and general.¹

His son, Yahya was appointed by al-Hadi as his vizier, the first official of Islamic state with the powers of supreme executive head. Yahya's son and successor Jafar is known as perhaps the most illustrious of Abbasid viziers with al-Fazl, his elder brother to support him as junior minister and seal-keeper. They

1. Katib : meaning writer was the record keeper and ascribe with virtually no executive functions. Authors of the primary sources like Jahshyari and Fabri consider Katib as the substitute title of vizier. Jahshyari, pp. 19-37, Faori, V. II, pp. 836-843; and Haji Saifuddin, Athar-al-Vazir, pp. 22-29.

practically ruled the empire.¹

The Barmakids present a fine account of administrative capability which was to a large extent responsible for the power and stability of the caliphate during the time of Harun-al-Rashid (786-809). Ironically their power excited the jealousy of Harun for whatever he was indebted to them. Threatened by excessive accumulation of power and wealth the caliph contrived their extinction. Jafar was treacherously murdered in 187 A.H. (802 A.D.). Al-Fazl and Yahya languished in prison until death at At-Muqqah.² In the words of Hitti, the vizier acted as the caliph's alter ego. By shouldering the burden of the state to an extent tantamount to making the caliph's authority only a matter of formality the vizier lived in princely pomp and luxury and wielded at the same time over riding powers of appointing and dismissing governors and of confiscating their properties.

1. Jahshyari, p. 11, al-Fakhri, pp. 194-209. cf. E.D. Joitien, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions, p. 182. Hitti, pp. 294-5.

2. al-Fakhri, pp. 209-10.

Vizarat acquired the status and position of a "vizier by divine right", so aptly illustrated by the diploma of appointment that caliph al-Nasir (d. 622 A.H. : 1225 A.D.) issued to his vizier, Mohammad Ibne Barz-al-jummi.¹

The Caliph is presented as the representative of God on earth and the vizier as the representative of the Caliph over his subjects, thus inheriting both the sanctity and authority entailing upon a king by divine right.²

1. Moid-al-din Mohammad bin Mohammad bin Abdul Karim Barz was generally called al-jummi because he was native of jum. He was appointed in 617 A.H. by Caliph al-Nasir. He continued as minister under al-Zaheer and al-Mustansir. Fakhri, pp. 314-25.
2. "Mohammad Ibne Barz-al-jummi is our representative throughout the land and amongst our subjects. Therefore, he who obeys Him, obeys us, and he obeys us, obeys God, and God shall cause him who obeys Him to enter Paradise. As for one who, on the other hand, disobeys our vizier, he disobeys us disobeys God, and God shall cause him who disobeys Him to enter hell-fire." Fakhri, pp. 314-16; cf. Hitti, History of the Arabs.

The rule of the Abbasid Caliphs was full of gloomy instances, of political turmoil, intrigue, conflict, struggle for power and civil strife.¹ With the introduction specially of Turkish elements in the military which rose to prominence in the time of Wasil Billah (d. 232 A.H.; 864 A.D.) and Mutawakkil (247 A.H.; 861 A.D.). The caliphal court became a permanent battle ground for conflicting interests. More often than not, these conflicts were centred around the person of the vizier, who invariably happened to be deeply involved as

1. Civil war between Amin and Mamun on the issue of succession may be recalled ; see, the details in

Ibn-al-Athir, VI, p. 73, 75, 170, 183.

Ibn-e-Khaldun, VII, p. 40-46; cf. Hitti, History of the Arabs, pp. 303-4, 332-37, 340-42, 406, 409, 414, 417, 419, 425, 461.

leader of one or the other party.¹

This struggle was as much for survival of the persons involved as of the state and even the caliph. In the early phases when the Muslim Junta or the elite were not as yet fully accustomed to the institution of vizarat, such as was adopted later from the Iranian practice, the tendency was towards saturate accumulation of power. This naturally excited the jealousy of caliphs, political murders seemed to be the only solution and perhaps naturally so in a state depending for survival mainly on the sword. Vizier after vizier was put to death, imprisoned or poisoned to make the office as much abhorred as coveted.

1. For instance Ibne-e-Aiyat was executed because he disliked al-wasiq from his vizarat days in the time of Mautasim. The troops of al-Mutawakkil headed by Shruyah bin Kiera a Turkish general and Amir gathered round Ubaidullah bin Yahya bin Khagan the vizier of Mutawakkil out killed al-Mutawakkil, or Abul Fadl Jafar bin Mohammad, Abu Musa Isa bin Farkhan Shah, Abu Jafar Ahmad bin Israil and later ministers of al-Muhtadi were dismissed for the same reasons. al-Fakhri, pp. 234-38, 239-46, Ibn-al-athir, V. VII, pp. 68-69.

The conflicts intensifying with the growth of Turkish power and the establishment of minor dynasties, a point was reached when even the life of the caliph hung in suspense. From the time of Harun-al-Rashid to the time of al-Mustakfi (333-334 A.H.; 944-45 A.D.) the execution of at least four viziers and one caliph is recorded, many more were imprisoned till death. Among these viziers were powerful plenipotentiaries as well as lesser ministers,¹ whose prestige and power

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1. al-Fazal bin Sahal was killed by Mamun in 202 A.H. (817 A.D.). He combined two vizarats as master of the pen and of the sword (in the terms of Mawardi, he was truly a vizier-e-tafviz a plenipotentiary). Ahmad bin Yousuf bin Yasim, successor of Ahmad bin Abu Khalid; vizier to Mamun recommended for this post by Hasan bin Sahal was vaccinated at the instigation of Mamun and he died of asthma. The reason was probably Mamun's annoyance over his using the same perfume which Mamun used. This was reported by his enemies. Mohammad bin Abdul Malik-al-ziyat was killed by the same iron barrel which was made by al-ziyat himself for others at the orders of al-wasiq because he (al-ziyat) opposed wasiq's nomination for the throne. Abu Saqr Ismail bin Sulbul, Minister to al-Mautamid appointed by al-Muwaffiq (Mautamid's brother and co-ruler) liked by the troops disliked by the Amirs seized by the caliph imprisoned and tortured him till he died in 249-51 A.H. (863-865 A.D.). al-Fakhri, pp. 220-22, 224-26, 234, 249.

had been reduced to make them a plaything in the hands of military adventurers.¹ The territories of the Caliphate, which at one time included the whole of Iraq, Iran, Khurasan, parts of Transoxiana and Africa had through a process of disintegration become a conglomeration of innumerable independent and semi independent states carved out from time to time by ambitious generals and governors or even Turkish tribal chiefs issuing forth from Turkistan. Few of them stayed long enough and were overrun by other adventures. In this process the territorial configuration of the caliphate kept changing with the rise and fall of minor dynasties Arab, Iranian, Turkish.

1. Mutavakkil was killed by Turkish army headed by Shamiyah bin-Kisra. Al-Akbas bin al-Hussain the vizier to Muqtadi was killed by the Turkish troops in the reign of Muqtadir billah. Ali-bin al-rurat was put in jail three times, was made minister three times and lastly he was executed by al-Muqtadir in 322 A.H. Asad Yasir bin Abdullah bin Muhammad-al-Kaluzari, minister to Muqtadi was stoned to death by the army. Abdullah-al-Saridi was appointed by Ruzun as minister to Muqtadi. Ibid., pp. 238, 254, 260-62, 269.

The house of Saman fell to the malcontents of the Ziyarids, who in turn lost to the Yara Khanids of Bukhara, these last fell to Ghaznavid arms. The process continued with the successive rise and fall of the great Seljuks, Khwarizmshahs and finally the Ghoriids.¹ These dynasties that rose at the expense of the Caliphal state kept up an appearance of legitimacy by extracting the investiture of sovereignty which the caliph, not being in a position to refuse, confirmed on them.²

1. Fahir Zul Yaminayn the celebrated general of Mamun, descended from a Persian slave, was appointed by that Caliph to the Government of Khurasan in 820 A.D. where he and his dynasty became practically independent, though holding their authority by patent of the Caliphs and with express acknowledgment of vassalage. They did not attempt to extend their power much beyond the borders of their province, and after about half century collapsed, completely. Overrun by the Saffavids in 872 A.D. Saffavids emerged as serious threat to the Zahirids as well as to the Caliphate. The house of Saman was instigated by the Caliph for being released from the clutches of the Saffavid, the family of copper-smiths. See Lane Poole, *Mohammadan Dynasties*, pp. 128-133, 136, 144, 149, 153. Also see, C.E. Bosworth, *Islamic Surveys*, pp. 99-122.
2. Iqub bin Lais bin Saffar, after the capture of Persia and outskirts of India posed serious threat to the Caliph of Baghdad, Al-Mawtamid. Hitti, pp. 461-2.

They owed nominal allegiance to Baghdad even though actual relations between the Caliph and the userpers were sometimes hostile.¹ Al-Mawardi had grown under the impress of the political holocaust spelled out by a multi-cornered conflict between the Turk and the Dailamite army officers.² He, precocious as the child was, must not have failed to take cognizance of the degeneration that had seized the Islamic state. The generous apportionment of land (iqta) among military personell started by Muizz-al-Daulah in desperate bid to keep control of the army had exhausted the state's financial resources.³ The treasury was empty so much so that even the Caliph was forced to survive on pension and a small portion of land by the Buwahyd masters.⁴

1. Mahmud Ghaznavi threatened the Caliph to crush entire Baghdad under the feet of elephants. The issue was resolved and Mahmud repented. Unsurul-Ma-ali Kaikans, Jayus Nama, p. 122.

2. Ibn-al-Athir, V. VIII, pp. 123-37.

3. Ibid., p. 150.

4. Ibid., p. 148.

Having failed to rehabilitate the state's economy by positive measures, the military Junta was again and again deployed to implement various instruments of fleecing the population, rich and poor alike, of their wealth and property.¹ Merchants and respectable man fled from the country to escape the oppression. Farmers were ruined, industries suffered from the lack of patronage and investment. Artisans spread out to neighbouring states in search of work. In such state of anarchy and confusion, justice became a casualty. The Caliph living on licence from their co-rulers looked on helplessly and without hope of rectification. Maintenance of a precarious survival in the face of adversity and mental and monetary bankruptcy being their only concern. They could neither wail nor woe at what may be described as an abominable situation the Islamic state ever found itself caught in.

1. Ibid., p. 137.

Al-Mawardi came to Baghdad to receive higher education. At this time he was at the prime of his youth. Abul Hamid-al-Asfaraini Hasan Jeebi,¹ the famous master of Islamic tradition (Ilmul Hadith), Abu Khalifa al-Jumahi² the Arabicist and his other teachers must have shared the general anxiety of the Abbasids and felt aggrieved at the moral and mental turpitude of nobles, princes and officers. The young student seems to have imbued from them, a natural reticence to approve of what lack of dignity. The Abbasid princess fought with each other to wear the crown and disgracefully surrendered themselves into a position of subordination.³ His appointment as jazi later on as chief justice with the title of Aqz-al-quzzat,⁴ brought him into the ranks of officers in the administration. Notably, the department of justice was still the concern

1. Shahar-al-Asbab, V. 3, p. 286.

2. Ibn-Khalikan, V. 2, pp. 444-45.

3. The period of al-Mustakfi ended and after him ruled al-Muqtadir's son al-Mutawilla, who accepted all the dictates of Muiz-al-Daula in 334 A.H./954 A.D., al-Fakhri, p. 280.

4. Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. III, p. 416, cf. Jamaruddin Khan, al-Mawardi's theory of state, Chapter II, p. 18.

of the caliph, the Buwahyd amir having no powers over it. In this position Mawardi, found excellent opportunity for acquiring intimate personal knowledge of the conditions as well as of the nature of relationship existing between the caliph and the Buwahyds. Legalities involved in the situation and the solution to the existing problems must have occupied his thoughts. Herein we find the source of inspiration for his extremely logical treatises the ahkam-al-bulturnya, adab-al-hakim and Maqabatal-Mulk.¹ Coming from the pen of one of the most prolific writers in the Muslim world, a highly learned scholar of Islamic jurisprudence who had the additional advantage of being a practising judicial officer. The ideas contained in these books bear the stamp of incontrovertable authenticity. Mawardi's political thought is not a Philosophy of the statecraft. It has for its base the highly concrete code of the shariat, the tradition of the Islamic practices

1. Reference may be made to some other books on political Philosophy such as adab-al-hakim and Tahsil-ul-Nazar-fi Tathil-ul-Afkar (on warfare). He also contributed at least four books on jurisprudence, four on ethical philosophy and theology. See, the details in the preface to adab-al-Dinwal-Dunya. pp. 1-16.

to the exacting demands of which it meticulously confirms. For that reason Mawardi's ideas remain native and are applicable exclusively to the Islamic state. To put it in another way : al-Mawardi's work was to interpret and reconstruct the principles of Islamic polity from the Islamic law which had already been so elaborately codified by the four Imams namely Imam Abu Hanifa 699-766 A.D., Imam Malik bin Anas 718-795 A.D., Imam Mohd. Bin Idris Shafai 767-820 A.D. and Ahmad bin Hambal 780-855 A.D. in the preceding centuries.¹ Thus Mawardi, emerges as a pioneer interpreter of the Islamic state in the same capacity as Imam Abu Hanifa was in the field of Fiqah. Mawardi's work is to be noted not for originality but for its fidelity to the Islamic law. It is a piece of deft learning rather than of creative thinking; hence a work not the least significant for any speculative import for which the author, writing within the highly defined

1. Abul Hasan Ali bin Mohd., bin Habib al-Mawardi was himself an orthodox Shafai but his thought is not greatly influenced by this school. Subki, Fatayat-al-shafiah, V. III p. 403 and Ibn Khaldun V. I pp. 410-13.

confines of ecclesiastical law, had but the narrowest latitude of originality to invest. On this account al-Mawardi's work remains subject to criticism only to the extent that an oversight of an error of interpretation can be pointed out. Barring this, the system constructed by him remains as the original term of reference for all subsequent writers. In this reconstruction of Islamic political thought Mawardi, fulfills a great need, that is that of filling up of a lacuna and of providing the guidelines for the state. He was concerned with the problem of saving the state from further disintegration and this he sought to achieve by specifying the legal position, functions, powers and the duties of Imam and his officers of whom the vizier occupied the supreme position.¹

1. The work *al-Ahkam-al-Sultanya* is a brief guideline to all sections of administration which includes Imam, vizier, Amir, Naqib, Amir, Qazi and so on. He intended to explain their positions and other related details in other separate booklet, for vizier, for instance he wrote *adab-al-wazir* and for amirs and military generals, he wrote *al-Ahkam-al-Sultanya*. He did not forget independent states. For Sultans, he gave guidelines in his treatise *Hasihat-al-Mulk* (unpublished M.S. in Paris). His book *Adab-al-Din-wal Dunya* is guideline to all sections of society including administrators.

Mawardi's writings seem to have been intended to highlight the weaknesses entailing upon the state through continued dual authority which, in fact, was the usurpation rather than sharing of the legal authority of the sovereign by a subordinate.¹

In contrast to this *Mizamulmulk* 1017-1093 A.D. represented the interests of a minor state existing within the fold of the caliphate.

Fughril beg 1037-63 A.D. the founder of the Saljuq dynasty had begun his career as a refractory tribal chief and had arisen ultimately to become the sovereign of a state carved out of from Ghaznavid territories.² In 1058 A.D. al-Bassassiri, a Turkish slave general in the service of the Buwayhids and the

1. al-Ahkam-al-Bulaniya, see Chapter III, pp. 30-34.

2. Fughril finally defeated Masud at Dandjan. The area of Azerbaijan, Mosul, Iraq and a great portion of Khurasan were captured by Fughril. Ibn-al-Athir, V. VIII, pp. 302-318.

latter's representative and plenipotentiary (Amid al-Baghdad),¹ ordered the ~~Amir~~ to be read in the name of Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir. ~~Amir~~ secretly invited Rughril Beg to overthrow the Buwayhids.² Rughril arrested al-Bassassiri and replaced al-~~Amir~~ in his former power.

Rughril's star was on ascendance. He consolidated his position further by entering into matrimonial alliance with the caliph who had already conferred upon him the investiture of sovereignty in 1057 A.D. In return for which Rughril offered presentations of precious jewels and other things all worth about one million Dinars.³

1. Al-Bassassiri was the representative of Malik-al-Mu'izz who was virtually governed by al-Bassassiri. Rughril Beg helped Caliph al-~~Amir~~ to get rid of him later he was killed and al-~~Amir~~ was reinstated on the Baghdad throne. See the details, Ibn al-Athir, VII, pp. 232-233, 236, 238 and 239.
2. The relations of Abbassids with Buwayhids extremely deteriorated with the appointment of Amid-al-Baghdad especially al-Bassassiri's dictator. Confirmation of conquered land with the title of Amir on Rughril Beg without the will of Buwayhid general was actually the bases of the punishment which they awarded to al-~~Amir~~, Ibid, p. 30.
3. Caliph al-~~Amir~~ gave his daughter to Rughril Beg and conferred the title of Sultan on him in reward to his service that he rendered for his re-establishment of power. Ibid., V. A, p. 7.

This position continued in the times of Alparsalan. The Saljuqs acted as the protectors of the Imamate, not only against ambitious chiefs and petty princes but also against the Fatimid power.¹ The institution of Vizarat was revived and the vazier was enabled to function the consonance with the norms of its dignity and status.² A status quo in the relations between the caliph and his protege established through acts of mutual obligation was not in the nature of times. The coming of the Saljuqs was in effect the replacement of one usurper by another. Ambition violated the cordial relations

1. King-Alp-Arsalan reconquered all those areas which were annexed by the Fatimids. Khutba was read in Mecca and Medina in the name of Abbasid Caliph. Dastur-al-Mazra, M.S. 19 B - 24a.
2. As soon as Saljuqs reinstalled Caliph al-Qaim on the throne of Baghdad Fakhr-al-Daulah Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Mohammad, commonly known as al-Jahir the cleverest and most estate of mankind was appointed as the vizier of al-Qaim in 483 A.H./1090 A.D. Ali bin Hussain bin Ahmad bin Mohammad bin Umar bin al-Musallim is not of much importance but he was made minister earlier to al-Jahir. al-Fakhri, pp. 281-85.

outtressed and strengthened by matrimonial. The
 Baljuqs became the virtual rulers of Baghdad while the
 caliph retreated into obscurity. Malik Shah gave his
 daughter to Muqtadi.¹ Nizamulmulk became the father-
 in-law of the caliph's vizier and received the title of
 Naji-amir-al-meminin and Taj-al-hazratin.² Already the
 names of Malik Shah and Nizamulmulk Rasi had been
 included in the Khutba at Baghdad. Malik Shah's name
 appeared on the reverse side of the Baghdad coins.
 effective authority was exercised by the Sultan through
 a shahna or the Kotwal of Baghdad, who may be described
 as a Baljuq version of the Dailamite Amid-al-

1. Malik Shah's wife Surkan Ataturk's daughter was married
 to Muqtadi in 474/1081 A.D. but she was sent to the
 Caliph's palace six years later in 480/1087 A.D.
 Nizamulmulk was the wakil of Malik Shah in his
 marriage. However, cordiality of relations between
 the king and Caliph continued to exist even after
 this marriage because it was conditional and the
 caliph did not fill the condition for long time.
 However, a son called Jafar was born of this daughter.
 Ibn-al-Athir, V. X, pp. 143-53-55.

2. Naji Saifuddin, Athar-al-Nizari, p. 210.

Baghdad.¹

Justification for such a state of affair was not wanting. Dissatisfaction with the terms and conditions that accompanied the marriages combined with the dismissal of Nizamul Malik's son in law Amid-al-Daulah who was also the Caliph's vizier to give point to the contempt and disregard with which the caliphal authority was kept in the esteem of the Sultan and his minister.²

No mean role was played in this tussel by the Saljuq queen Turkan Khatun,³ mother in law of caliph al-Muqtadi. This interesting character appears as a

1. Salad-al-Daulah was the Shahna of Baghdad who was later replaced by Aodan, however the Caliph was not pleased with the Shahna because we find an evidence that the Caliph sent Sheikh Abu Ishaq Shafa'i to report the affairs to Malik Shah and Nizamulmulk. Abu-al-Athir, V. X, pp. 42-75.

2. al-Rakhri, p. 287

3. The sources refer to four wives of Malik Shah one was divorced and Nizamulmulk married her. Second was a slave wife. Mohammed and Banjar born of her in 1082 AD and 1084 AD respectively. Third was Zubaida Khatun, who was a Saljuq princess, daughter of Isquti bin Chighri Beg gave birth to Barkyaruq born 1081 AD, fourth and the most important was Jalalya Khatun a Kara Khaind princess 1064 AD commonly known as Turkan Khatun who gave birth to Mahmud. Ibn-al-Athir, V. X, p. 20, 212, Athar-al-Mu'tar, pp. 208-210.

pivotal personality in all the intrigues and conspiracies hatched at the caliphal court as much as the court of the sultans. She was the main instigator of Malik Shah in his demand for the nomination of Jalaf as the future caliph in place of Muqtadi's eldest son, Mustanshir the nominated successor and their apparent of the caliph of Baghdad.¹

Turkan's emergence as leader of a powerful faction was, at any rate not an isolated phenomenon but only one of a string of examples in faction fights and intrigues for power with which the history of medieval muslim states appears to be full. It brings us to an important question of the basis on which muslim polity was structured.

The precariousness of the existence of viziers, caliphs and sultans exemplified by their murders, the continued subjection of caliphs to the dictates of ephemeral sovereigns in power, the murky intrigue-ridden

1. Last visit of Malik Shah and Hizamulmulk to Baghdad was important from various points of view such as the murder of Hizamulmulk and placement of Jalaf on the caliphal throne even the Caliph al-Muqtadi was compelled to pit Baghdad. Malik Shah also died in the mean time. Ibn-al-Athir, V. X, 68, 70, 72, and Athar-al-Muzra, pp. 210-13.

atmosphere of the courts where every inmate must inevitably belong to a faction or *perish*, are all symptoms of a deep rooted malice, besetting the Caliphate as much as the Turkish states which imbibed both the weaknesses and the blessings of each other.

In the first place, it must be noted that neither the Umayyad nor the Abbasid states were established in consonance with the Islamic law, except in broad principles of political ethics (enunciated in the *Quran* or the Prophet's tradition (and these two were rarely observed)). These states had developed on regional custom and practice. The Caliphate resembled in character to oriental absolutist monarchies rather than the Islamic democracy visualised in the rule of the pious caliphs. Perhaps such deviation was necessitated by the demands the vastness of the conquered domains placed on them. The Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates were highly centralized government and the political institutions had had to be inevitably retained as they existed in the conquered lands. Yet the tribal democratic notion that the caliph was only first among equals persisted. The same was true of the numerous

dynastic states that came into being at the expense of the caliph.

Whereas the concept of equality admitted of no succession by heridity, the monarchical character of the caliphate took for granted the reasonableness of primogeniture. With Muawiyah began the practice of nominating the eldest son as successor. In the strict interpretation of Islamic law such practice was bound to be a stumbling block making the task of nomination increasingly difficult. The door was opened for rulers to attempt the establishment of dynastic rule not only led to serious trespass of the spirit and law of Islam but also ushered in an era of strife, engendered the vilest and the most irresponsible intrigues of political adventures identifying their personal interests and security with the machinations of influential king-makers. In each successive regime it was possible to establish a case for or against a candidate by appealing either to the adopted custom of primogeniture or to its inadmissibility, in contradiction to the truly Islamic democratic principles, more often than not the latter stand point was only a subterfuge, for, invariably, alternative candidacies drew legitimacy from the fact

of their belonging to royal blood rather than from personal qualifications.

However, the intrigues would not come to an end with the ascendancy of a candidate but persisted. It showed in the form of personal jealousies, vendettas, party politics, incriminations, betrayals and murders, all of which gnawed at the very root of the state. Even the army was divided. Left with no effective military power the state became thoroughly incapacitated when called upon to cope with the threat of disintegration posed by the issuance of petty Turkish tribal chiefs, not otherwise powerful enough to harm the sovereignty of a cliph. They were encouraged and aided in their ventures by the lack of any potential defensive power in the state.

Ironically the Turkish states thus established at the expense of caliphal territories themselves suffered from the absence of any incontrovertible rule of succession. In course of time each of these states fell victim to and were finally vanquished by the same negative forces that had licked the mother state.

In such situations uncertainty of life and tenure loomed largely over the ruler and also the viziers. The

brute rule of party politics pushed them both in the simmering fray of intriguing nobles and they were obliged to utilise their own resources to ensure their survival. The vizier, the virtual executive head of the state, would seek to entrench himself behind a vast hierarchy of supporters assigned to key offices in the central and provincial administration. The exclusion of such aspirants as belonged to rival groups only added upon the existing threats to security and stability which, in turn, demanded still more rigorous safeguards. To ensure unquestioned support, the viziers turned to the expedient of filling high administrative offices with the nearest of their kith and kin.¹ The need to create

1. The appointment of sons and sons in law on key posts and strategically important frontiers of the state and recruitment of 2000 military slaves was the demand of hour without which stability and existence of the vizier had become almost impossible. Frequent murders of Abbasid viziers, vizier of Alp-Arsalan like Kundari and viziers of later Saljuqs took place probably because they failed to withstand the faction in opposition. Nizamulmulk however certainly realised this fact and it also became a point of jealousy and mutual intrigues between him and other faction i.e., Nizamites and Turkmanids. Ibn al-Athir, V. 2, p. 69-70, Muft Aqleem, pp. 166-67, and Maji Saifuddin Athar-al-muzra, pp. 207-210, introduction to Yusufnama, p. 7.

barriers of security around, enforced among these officers, complete subservience to their master. Although good from administrative point of view the unity thus forged and the power thus built up by the ruling faction did not fail to attract royal hostility and many viziers fell victim to the combined threat from the ruler and the faction in opposition.

The rise and fall of Nizamulaulk Tusi, although only one of a string of similar episodes interspersed over the whole period of muslim history, still remains as a telling illustration of this peculiar character of politics. This strong-willed son of a tax collector in the service of Abu Ali Shazan, the administrator (Amir) of Balah under Chighri Beg,¹ was by no means so peaceable as to waive of an opportunity even though it meant inevitable collusion with the intriguing factions of the court, Born on Zil-quada 21st 408 A.H. April 1017 A.D.,² his father, Ali called him Hasan in the tradition

1. E. G. Brown, Literary history of Persia, V. II, p. 176 and Byasat Nama, p. 7, Litti, p. 477.

2. Ibn-e-Khallikan, p. 143.

of the fourth pious Caliph.¹ His early education in the traditional learnings of Islam under the guidance of Imam Muwaffaq, groomed him into a learned scholar of the Quran and traditions. But it was to his training under Abdul Samad,² one of the leading exponents of jurisprudence that he developed a taste for administration and politics. Hasan got excellent opportunities to travel widely in central Asia until he came in with Abu Ali Chazan, who appointed him his secretary (Katib).³

1. The dream recorded in Dastur-al-Kuzra, reads that "Zamarrud Khatun" (Nizam's mother) entered the paradise where she saw al-Fatima. Fatima advised her to name him as Hasan because his father's name is Ali. Dastur-al-Kuzra, f. 14a, 16b.

2. A. Hazzaz Kanpuri, Nizamimulk Tusi, pp. 50-54.

3. Dastur-al-Kuzra, f. 5a & E. J. Browne, p. 175.

the reasons of Shazan's dislike for him subsequently would perhaps be never known. He must, however, have been quite impressed by the talents of this young, ambitious incumbent, for he recommended Hasan to Alp-Arsalan, who appointed him his minister. It was not long before Hasan realized the importance of factionalism and intrigue as an instrument for materialising political ambitions. Soon he found himself at the head of the faction opposed to Kundari¹ the chief minister and Nizam's own superior and caused Kundari to be imprisoned and executed by the orders of Alp-Arsalan in 1047 A.D.²

1. Saifuddin remarks :

In a message to the king and the vizier Nizamulmulk, Kundari said :

Athar-al-wuzra, p. 204-7.

2. Dastur-al-wuzra, p. 6b-7a, Athar-fi-Tartib-al-Fawal, r.8. c.f. Browne. Ibid., p. 147. N. A. Sherani, Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration, p. 134. Hitti, p. 68.

Hasan, was only twenty nine when he joined the service of Alp-ar-Salan. One year later he had become the full fledged minister and embarked on a long, glorious career of twenty nine years during which period he dominated the whole political scape of Central Asia, never before or after rivalled by a vizier in Islamic history. He manipulated the succession of Malik Shah against the warlike Tuksh, trained and educated him, built up the state's finances by ruthless enforcement of discipline and extensive reforms¹ made the Caliph virtually subserviant to his own authority and extended the Seljuq empire upto the precincts of India, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, China and Syria. He had the audacity of refusing the king sixty thousand Dinars. A virtual ruler, his master, otherwise known as the most powerful king, was reduced to a mere shadow of vizier. At one time Malik Shah felt himself at a loss to know whether Nizamulmulk was his vizier

1. In a message to Malik Shah, Nizamulmulk admitted this fact. Ibn-al-Athir, V. XV, p. 71, Athar-al-Buzra, p. 210.

or co-ruler of the state. Pressed to the extreme Malik Shah once threatened to take away the minister's 'inkstand' (qalam Dan-e-Vizarat) meaning thereby to dismiss him. But he elicited the retort that the Saljuq empire stood on the power of his ink-stand and the king would be well advised to be on his guard before he thought of harming the minister, for, as he said, "enough strong are my arms".¹

The strength, of which Nizamulmulk so boasted had accrued to him as much from his wisdom applied to nursing the state into a power, as from his well planned system of intrigue and partisanship. Nizamulmulk, had rightly realized that political power was achieved and survival ensured by buttressing his own authority by a powerful faction. He built up an impregnable rampart of officers and nobles drawn from his own progeny and faithful relatives. By the same logic, it was on the unquestioned fidelity to their master, that the prestige

1. Ibn al-Athir, V. 2, p. 70-71, Ma'at al-Nasab, V. 11, p. 197 and Asrar al-Mulk, p. 210, c.f. E. J. Browne, V. 11, p. 175-77.

and power of these nobles depended enemies, critics, refractory subordinates and men of doubtful allegiance were either eliminated or cleverly dissipated.¹

The emergence of Turkan Khatun, the irreconcilable opponent of Nizamulmulk was thus not a co-incidence. She had been thrown up into prominence by the same forces as had brought Nizamulmulk to power. In a life and death struggle for securing the Saljuq throne for her own son, Mahmud, whom the Nizam opposed, she brought into her own orbit of influence a rival aspirant for ministership, Faj-ul-Mulk Abul Ghannaim Marzbani bin Asadroz Khusr² was inferior to none in resourcefulness, administrative acumen, wisdom, learning, pedigree and

1. The cases of putting out the eyes of Ibn-Sulaiman Yar, Abu-al-Muhasin and killing Malik Shah's court jester, Jafarak may be recalled.
2. Fajalmluk Abul Ghannaim, he came from a vizier's family in Fars through the patronage of the slave general Saftegin central figure of opposition against Nizamulmulk in the court and secretary to Turkan Khatun and tutor of Sultan's male children.

above all in the skill for hatching conspiracies. with Turkan Khatun at his back, he left no stone unturned to bring about the Nizam's downfall. As it was, all the opposing forces ultimately combined to see the colossus fall to the dagger of an assassin.¹ Sure enough, Turkan and Raj-al-Mulk had played no small role in the deed than Malik Shah himself.

This, in a nutshell, provides the background to the political philosophy of Nizamulmulk. In spite of the fact that the contemporary historical sources fail to give really intimate account of the complicated politics of the Saljuq court, or any wholesome information with regard to its administrative structure, or the achievements on which Nizamulmulk's reputation rested. It is easy to identify his political ideas as eloquent commentaries on the subterraneous forces that governed the rise and fall of the dynasties and empires. In an atmosphere charged with perfidy,

1. Ibn-al-Athir, V. X, p. 70-71.

treachery, selfishness where virtue waited upon factional power and right was measured by manipulative skill, all glory, all power remained inherently ephemeral and survival was an art. Mizanulmulk's career and the view of his writings reveal him as a sincere well wisher of the Saljuq dynasty. He seems to know the good from bad. His discussions in the *Syasaat Nama* vibrate with idealism and sense of justice : justice to people, to one's own profession, to the sovereign and to oneself.¹ But the painful imperative of having to exist and justify oneself in a circumstance where every component of state authority precariously hunged in a state of equilibrium by complex gravitational forces working in opposite directions, makes the means directly subserviant to the ends. Elimination of hostile elements by murder or bribe or by simple recouff is no sin should they be necessary to satisfy the demands of justice.

1. *Syasaat Nama*, pp.

Unlike Mawardi, Nizamulmulk's task was not the interpretation of Islamic law. He interprets an existing situation. Like al-Mawardi, he offers no structural alternatives of state. He is concerned with subtler aspects of relationship amongst the various characters enacting a peculiar situation wherein centripital forces appear to maintain the existence of the state by tension. His recommendations are in the nature of worldly wisdom. A king is like a wealthy man surrounded by claimants having conflicting ambitions and as such must keep his eyes open and mind alert to the dangers inherent to the crowned heads. The vizier is either a friend or a foe. A good administrator discriminates between man and man and deals with them likewise underlying the concept of a 'truly' Islamic state, the caliphate is assumed to be in many senses the embodiment of the political aspirations of muslim corporate life. In many senses, however, it highlighted fatal deviations from the original concept envisaged in the teachings of the Prophet. The way Islam's power had expanded had naturally resulted in the corruption of its original democratic concepts. A large empire such as that of the Umayyids made the displacement of democratic idealism by personal

authoritarianism incumbent both structurally and functionally. The Turkish Muslim states arising from its disintegration, far from resuscitating the Islamic spirit, had made the state look all the more odious through adulteration of institutions; and since return to the old democratic concept was clearly not feasible the knowledgeable among the intelligentsia were inevitably set to reconciling a historical fact to the fundamentals of Islamic polity. Unlike European philosophers theories of states remain alien to both al-Mawardi and Nizamulmulk. Instead their philosophy is by and large instruction in political virtue applied to the existing framework of the state.

It is in this specific context that the institution of vizarat finds a conspicuous place next in scope and importance to only that of the sultan. Although, as referred to earlier, the term vizarat was quite in vogue in the earliest stages of the Imamate, the vizarat of our philosophers' concept is what it later on developed under the impact of Iranian tradition. As a supreme functional authority, as understood by the European equivalent of chancellor, controller general or prime minister, it came into being only as late as

the time of second Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur (754-775 AD). It grew in importance subsequently as the power of the Caliph waned; so much so that except for the title of sovereignty, the vizier virtually became synonymous with the ruler of which the vizarat of Nizamulmulk provides the most characteristic example.

It follows then that many of the discussions relating to the attributes, functions, moral behaviour and responsibilities addressed to the sovereign clearly appear equally applicable to the vizier, as will be observed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE

Whereas the concept of vizarat occupies an important position in the political writings of Hawardi and Mizamulmulk Fusi; their objects were primarily those of providing a theoretical bases for their respective states namely the caliphate (750-1258) and the state of the Saljuqs. This object inevitably brings into discussion such institutions of vital importance as sovereignty, administration, justice, economic institutions, subjects and the officials of the state. To the subjects the elaboration of political ethics follows as necessary concomitant. In the background of their concepts of state should one therefore analyse their ideas about the ministerial office.

The emergence of the minor dynasties was a matter of great significance in the history of Islam. It cut across the basic structure and philosophy of Islamic polity as conceived in the principles broadly laid down in the scriptures and exemplified by the pious

caliphate. In Islam, sovereignty is understood to lie in the Ummah. The Khalifah is an elected head that represents the will of the Ummah which in turn emanates in the injunctions of the Sharia. The caliph is only the first among equals. He derives his authority from the people for the benefit of the people and for the protection and promotion of religion.

Difficulties arising in the practice of these principles after the expansion of Islam beyond the borders of Arabia, the caliphate underwent transformation from democracy into dynastic, autocracy. Disintegration set in with the establishment of the rival power of the Fatimids in Egypt and reached climax when the Buwayhids made the caliph at Baghdad virtually subservient to their authority. The Buwayhids, the Ghaznavids and the great Seljuks were representatives of the absolutist monarchies of the eastern lands of the caliphate. They had usurped the power of the caliph but had at the same time sought to legalise their existence by means of a formal investiture of sovereignty from the

caliph.¹

The legal problems arising from this situation were by no means small. The Sawayhids and the Saljuks were defacto sovereigns, a position which the caliph, unable to belie, sought to evade by insisting on their de jure subordination to his own authority. The Sultans, by no means unaware of their legal position, were not unwilling to respect the caliph's authority. But in actual fact they were independent sovereign more powerful practically than the caliph.

This peculiar situation called for a justification of the de jure authority of the caliph on the one hand and the de facto power of the sultans on the other. The former was the task chosen by al-Hawardi (972-1059), the later was the work of Nizamulmulk (1017-1091).

1. Early Saljuk Sultans also insisted on receiving diplomas from the caliphs, partly to place themselves on level of other existing powers like Ghaznavids & Karakhanids and solely to legalise their rule in accordance with traditional Islamic spirit. The sultan after Malik Shah got recognition from the caliph in order to consolidate their position against other claimants.

Al-Mawardi's purpose was primarily that of vindicating the supremacy of the caliph over all temporal authority. Of necessity his approach is juridical in character. The Imam or the caliph is presented as the supreme power, the sovereign personality whose will acquires incontrovertible authority from the Islamic law. He (al-Mawardi) makes a special issue of the usurping power of the sultans calling them amir al-istila, a position valid for governors appointed by the caliph. It clearly implies that the power of the sultan was derived from the imperial authority of the Caliph and conveniently sets aside the presumption of any other sovereign authority existing within the caliphal state except by usurpation. Hence the sultans presumed to enjoy independence under the legal sanction from the caliph.¹ Al-Mawardi's state therefore, is theoretically an Islamic state and the caliph its legal sovereign resting on God's will.

1. Al-Ahkam, Chapter 3, pp. 30-34.

Knowing the hazards underlying the juridical approach, Nizamulmulk very cleverly avoids any reference to the caliph. He treats the state as though it was the personal property of the sovereign and ventures to justify it by going to the origins of sovereign power. He considers human beings as basically selfish and undisciplined who rob and kill each other. God blesses them with a just king who suppresses evil, punishes the evil-doers, and brings out order from chaos. The sovereign creates a whole machinery of government to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities. For his actions he is responsible to God to whom alone he shall render his account on the day of judgement.¹

This line of approach is at once hypothetical and historical. Hypothetical for the questionable assumption about human nature; historical, in so far as it is based on a shrewd analysis of politics of the ages through which the institution of monarchy i.e., the sultanate had emerged.

1. Nizamulmulk, pp. 2-3.

Thus Nizam's figure stands out in relief as the intellectual God-father of the more widely known western philosophers, Machiavelli and Hobbes. The corollaries Nizam sought to draw from this novel argument in justification of Malik Shah's position as a sovereign, Machiavelli had drawn for Cesare Borgia in the 15th, and Hobbes for Charles II in the 17th century.

Thus, when Nizam ascribes the rise of a king to the will of God who mercifully appoints him for saving the people from anarchy, disorder and bloodshed, he endows him with a divine right to sovereignty far more unassailable than that of Machiavelli and Hobbes. The king remains the fountain head of law, an absolute autocrat whom the subjects have no moral right to challenge, a position adopted by both Hobbes and Machiavelli. By placing God at the apex of the motivational force, the prime cause of social order, who appoints the sultan for saving the people from sin, Nizamulmulk creates a state far more powerful than the Leviathan of Hobbes; and a sovereign more absolute than the one arising from a social contract. The sultan comes into existence not from an agreement of

the people with an individual which, in the case of Hobbes, should make his power subject to the right of popular resistance in the event of his failure to protect the agreeing party, but from the divine will seeking to save the people from destruction at the hands of the covetous, nasty and unscrupulous neighbours. On the other hand the sovereignty of the sultan is never threatened by his failure. In all events the responsibility of the breakdown of law and order lies on the people themselves. He remains an autocrat whom the subjects have no moral right to challenge. They are bound to him by the original obligation to obey, since dissent tends to throw them back on the mercy of those who thrive by trading in disorder and bloodshed. Thus, the prime cause of society as also its antithesis is human sinfulness, or by the same logic, the subjects themselves. Sin and its punishment forms the keynote in the philosophy of Nizamulmulk; and he uses it with utmost convenience to save the king from all responsibility to the subjects. He is answerable only to God. Internal disorder and external aggression feature as the alternatives to obedience much in the same way as we find in the

prince of Machiavelli and the Leviathan of Hobbes.

Nizam was constrained to take this position from a more acute, though somewhat similar necessity that was faced by Hobbes and Machiavelli.¹

The Turks constituted the ruling race in the dynastic states of central Asia as also the dominant element both in the armies and administration. They had risen to political power from what was only a conglomeration of scattered tribes; and though they had adopted many of the institutions of the organised eastern politics under despotic monarchy, they had retained the vestiges of tribal democracies. During direct allegiance to their immediate chiefs and through them to the hierarchy of ruling authorities, they still believed in parity with all. The sovereign was only the first among equals; and theoretically he was understood to share the conqueror's domains with the

1. Hobbes's Leviathan, pp. 11, 135, 472-557 and Machiavelli, pp. 18, 31, 35, 44, 56, 57, 89. cf. Coenstien, Great Political Thinkers, pp. 278-97, 357-83.

rank and file. This notion was the keynote in the relationship of the people with the state. In high politics it resulted in the regementation of political influences exerted by his nobles, all contending for power and supremacy.

Nizam's concept of sovereignty resting as it does, on Divine will and necessitated by the need to militate the Turkish concept of equality is fundamental to his ideas about all the aspects of public administration. The vizier being the alter ego of the monarch, derives his authority from his sovereign and, representing him in all aspects emerge, as the most powerful of the strongest single person. He is charged with the responsibility of protecting and perpetuating the rule of the sovereign, from internal and external enemies. As suppresser of evil he is the monument of virtue, as protector of religion, he is punctitiously religious and God-fearing. Above all he is a man of unquestionable integrity. This concept of vizarat is evident from his work as well as writings.

Nizamul Mulk sought to establish his power as vizier by introducing drastic reform in the military organisation and the revenue department and carried out important

public works to induce his popularity among the people. By changing the traditional composition of the military and by regularising the Iqta system he shattered the power of the officers and nobles and reduced them to subjection without affecting their efficiency.

Military commanders were given Iqta lands which were not hereditary.¹ The military was divided into a number of regiments each composed of specified number of soldiers belonging to heterogeneous races, tribes and regions, "so that like-minded soldiers may not dominate." At the outset of his career he recommended to Malik Shah that the retiring soldiers be granted pension. He was right when he argued that living on state money would ensure their loyalty and prevent them from joining the ranks of enemies. Malik Shah refused and twice faced the

1. Bundari's well-known statement that Nizamulmulk introduced the practice of granting Iqtas to the soldieries is evidently untrue; such grants were already in common practice under the Buwayhids. What Nizamulmulk probably did not to regularise those who had already possessed in order to avoid any disturbance in the lower strata of the military.

revolt of Fakhsh.¹

Nizam regularised the conferment of titles on nobles and recommended check on lavity in this respect.² He insisted on discriminative treatment by the sovereign of the nobles according to their ranks, tacitly to pamper their vanity and their sense of distinction and to create a psychological barrier amongst them. In the *Siyasat Nama*, he instructs the Hajib that visitors should not be allowed presence before the king indiscriminately. Nobles should not be called frequently, for as he means to say, familiarity breeds contempt.³ Peasants and other tax payers received his special attention. In a situation charged with intrigue and malice, the support of the commoners was extremely valuable. To insure this he administrators to choose tax collectors with special care.

1. There is no evidence of the introduction of pension system in the early phase of Malik Shah's rule. But it seems that later Nizam introduced it on his own, for we come across no evidences of disgenereated on the side of the enemy.

2. *Siyasat Nama*, p. 185.

3. *Siyasat Nama*, p. 147.

steps to be taken in order to prevent oppressive methods in the collection of taxes. "Farmers should not be pressed hard", he writes, "for this would ruin them and the state as well."¹ further, "the Amalgar (state servants) should not be sent without written orders especially in cases of the realisation of revenue, because they can misuse their power and position and can realise excessive dues."

Strong monarchy, especially when it stood open to challenge by traditional concept of equal right, demanded that the king should always be fully aware of the attitudes of the peoples, the goings-on in public life, the activities of the nobles, officials and the influential persons in the city.

To realise this Nizamulmulk returns in his book to this theme again and again, viz. "a virtuous vizier brings glory to the name of the king," conversely when the vizier lacks in virtue, such disorder is created in the state as may have no end and the monarch is overtaken by worry and grief and the empire is without

1. Siyasat Nama, p. 22

tranquility."¹ He suggests that the king should keep enquiring his confidants in secret about the manner of the viziers functioning, for with him the good and bad of the state is sound.² His bearing and his character inevitably affects the subjects, since the subjects are like a herd and vizier their protector.³ Darius lost to Alexander because the former's vizier had secretly joined hands with the latter and when Darius was killed, Alexander remarked "negligence on the part of the king and dishonesty of the vizier carried him away."⁴

Nizam's concept of virtue is however not mere philosophical abstraction. It includes certain quantities which are of immediate practical importance for the vizier as the high functionary of the state. Virtue includes right belief kind heartedness, goodness of habits, religious duty, knowledgeability, generosity and faithfulness to the monarch.⁵

1. Siyasat Nama, p. 23

2. Ibid.,

3. Siyasat Nama, p. 25

4. Siyasat Nama, p. 34

5. Siyasat Nama, p. 218

The belief in high birth was the hallmark of Persian culture and is not a fad with Nizamulmulk. In most of the courts of the Turkish dynasties viziers belonged to Persian extraction, and Iran, being an ancient seat of culture, had given birth to most of the men of letters, who rose to the ranks of nobility. In contrast to this the Turks, despite having acquired much from Iranians whom they emulated, had not as yet developed a cognisable background of civility. Their heathen past was still in close proximity to their present. The few families that had risen above their original identity through one or two generations could hardly be expected to add to their civility as administrators. The virtues so punctiliously set out by the Nizam for a qualified vizier and his insistence on high birth are thus indirectly a justification of his own existence in the Turkish government and an appreciation of the existing situation. It is to be understood as a subjective proposition of practically no universal value and not as a condition of any doctrinal significance yet the virtues specified as part of the qualifications of a good vizier are not mere ultraisms with Nizamulmulk. These are principles of immense political

importance. These qualities were natural to the high born. For this reason Nizam al-Mulk prefers the sons of viziers as more suitable for the office of vizarat than others, just like it behoves the sons of monarchs to become monarchs.¹

His political opponents objected to the incurring of this enormous expenditure on the propagation of his faith. They precipitated frequent quarrels which gave room for the vizier to put his foot down on every matter. Students graduating from these schools were appointed to the higher and lower offices in the administration and their presence gave additional strength to his position.² Thus to Nizam al-Mulk right belief was plainly nothing else than belief in the orthodox faiths.

Religion iety is an important virtue, and for a muslim it implies strict adherence to islamic law. It is questionable, however, as to how the execution of

1. Siyasat Nizam, pp. 217-19.

2. Nawandi, Bahar-al-sudur, V. 2, p. 156. cf. ibid. Bulletin, 1959.

Islamic principles was possible in an autocratic state. Such a state must necessarily employ Machiavellian principles in order to justify its existence and to maintain firm hold on the state. Especially in a situation where other political forces are pressing hard it becomes difficult to practise complete piety. Nevertheless, as it was a Muslim state the Sultan, the vizier and other administrative officials were required to be pious to practise religion in its true spiritual sense. The administration must essentially be run in accordance with the basic tenets of Islam and its law, the sharia must be the guide in the matters of administration and justice. Here again the emphasis on religious piety is suggestive of the fact that other existing Islamic sects were devoid of this virtue. The other reason may be politically motivated. The neighbouring Fatimid state also propagated the inculcation of this virtue and considered themselves as divinely ordained people being most pious in the matter of religion. They claimed themselves to be the descendents of Fatima, the daughter of prophet Muhammad. It was irresponsible when for the sultans to practise religious piety, for,

they claimed themselves to be the champions of sunni faith. Yet another fact for its being indispensable was that every dynasty which emerged on political scene sustained the claim of being the champion of the sunni cause and declared the extinguished dynasty as irreligious or corrupt. The Samanids ousted the Saffavids on this basis and in turn the Ghaznavids did the same with them. The Saljuq who also overpowered the Ghaznavids on the same old pretext and could not retain power without adherence to religious piety.

Despite his emphasis on religious piety, Nizamalmulk speaks of the etiquettes to be observed in wine parties.¹ In Islam wine is forbidden; yet Nizam recommends wine for kings and though by implication. This recommendation makes religious piety a shallow virtue, which otherwise is essential even for kings.

Vizier is an important organ of the autocratic government and the essential function of the government is to look after the welfare of the people.² It is for

1. *Siyasat Nama*, pp. 86, 107, 149-151.

2. *Siyasat Nama*, pp. 23, 34, 36.

this reason that almost every important political thinker has rejected all forms of tyrannical governments. Nizamulmulk also aims at establishing a welfare government which would undoubtedly benefit the people, but not by sacrificing the interest of the state. According to the traditional semetic concepts, the king and the state have precedence over the subjects. The latter belong to the former; but not conversely so. The king is the repository of sovereignty and the subjects have no right to defy his authority.¹ The interest of the state, therefore, is prior to the personal or collective considerations. The position that Nizamulmulk has taken in this respect is therefore, in effect, little more than the reiteration of the rule already in vogue in the Islamic States.

Nizamulmulk like his predecessors safeguards the interest of the state yet he recommends the qualities of kind heartedness and generosity as essential for a vizier,

1. SIYASAT NAMA, Chapt. I and Chapt. 4.

but the connotation of the term is not as wide as commonly accepted. Kind heartedness is not synonymous with useless and vain piety. It only means benevolent attitude towards the people when necessary. At the time of draught for example when the crops are damaged the farmers must be exempted from the payment of revenue. They should not be pressed to pay unless they are, in fact, in such a position. Under the burden of taxes they must not be compelled to sell their cattle, for, they are their means and instruments. The ruin of the farmers would mean the ruin of the state.¹ Nizamulmulk instructs it be strictly against the use of coercive methods for realising taxes from the people.

It is in the interest of the state that it must provide livelihood to everyone. Absence of adequate means of livelihood brings turmoil. He recommends that more than one job should not be entrusted to one man and conversely more than one man should not be employed for one job. This rule would provide employment to many

1. Siyaset Nama, p. 22

and would create efficiency of the state services; for, the person employed for a single job would solely be responsible for its completion.¹

Keeping view the historical background of revolts and rebellions Nizamulmulk recommends that the vizier must acquaint himself with the affairs of the state. He must have the knowledge about the activities of the nobles, feudal lords (Muqtiyan) and other government officials such as Mutasarrif and Amil etc. He must also be informed about the ability and functioning of each and every qazi.² One who is inefficient should immediately be removed from his post. Balance of power in the recruitment of army is a point of unanimous agreement in Nawarid and Nizamulmulk.³ During peace time vizier should be strict and in war time, he should be polite. Machiavelli has also advised the prince to make the best use of them and a balance of power between mercenary and regular troops should at any cost be maintained and it is advisable for every wise prince.⁴

1. Ibid., pp. 198, 199, 209,-212.

2. Ibid., pp. 22, 35-47, 53-54, 74,75, 108, 147.

3. Siyasat Numa, Chapter 20.

4. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 55.

The importance of the post of qazi lays in the fact that the incumbent dispensed justice in the name of the king who derived this authority from the Almighty. The qazi was the preserver of the life and the property of muslim umrah. The vizier must be fully aware that they protected the people and dispensed justice as they should. Nizamulmulk also suggests the methods for procuring correct information about the different classes of nobles and officials. He advises the king to appoint the spies and informers to keep vigilance over nobles, to study the conditions of the subjects and to watch all kinds of activities going on in the frontier premises. He supports all other measures which were being practised earlier to check and watch various departments and particularly mentions the measure of appointing spies, for, Alp-Arslan believed in no such institution.¹ In brief, the government must fully be aware of all affairs that may affect the functioning of the state.

1. Siyasat Nama, Chapters 6, 9, 12, 13, 19.

In order to justify the co-existence of the virtual head, i.e., the caliph and his partner in sovereignty i.e., the tutelar head, the Suwwan, al-hawardi classifies the amarat into two categories i.e., the amarat bil istakfa (delegated amarat) and amarat bil istila (amarat by seizure). He speaks of the iqas as being of two kinds, luta-i-istisla (land with fiscal rights only) and luta-i-istila (land with proprietary rights). The former was held by an amir with delegated authority and the latter was occupied by amir bil istila.¹ Contrary to it incidently, Nizamulmulk did not accept any existence of luta-i-istila, for such a concept envisaged the existence of a state within a state. Muslim political thinkers like al-farabi and al-hawardi emphasize that caliph is viceregent of God on earth. Asserting the same fact Aquinas speaks of monarchy as the best form of government, describes its virtues and discusses the safeguards against its degeneracy into tyranny, the

1. al-hawardi, Al-ahkam-al-sultaniya, chapter 3.

rewards of rulership and the true aim of Government etc.¹ Thus according to both al-Mawardi and Nizamulmulk rulership is indivisible. Like al-Farabi, al-Mawardi, Nizamulmulk and Ibn al-Qayyim, Thomas Aquinas also stresses on the point that there are few born to rule and others to be ruled. The qualities that these scholars prescribe are also unanimous. While Machiavelli maintains that those who rise from private citizens to be princes merely by fortune or such who are granted state either by money or by favour of ruler in order to secure glory or to maintain his power or secure the throne by bribing army can last till the ruler is in power who had favoured him, is harmful to the stability of ruler and such prince or power.²

al-Mawardi like a grammarian conducted a study of vizarat institution on lexicological grounds and limited himself to some of the verses of the holy Quran (20, 28, - 32, 30, 33, 34). The word 'vizier' is said

1. W. Moenstern - Great Political Thinkers, pp. 209-228.

2. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 23.

to be derived either from YAKR, AYAKR or YAK (burden, the back-bone or place of refuge). According to al-Mawardi the institution originated in Arabia. Although in a preinstictive form it existed in Abyssinian, Byzantian during the life time of the Prophet. The Arabs were familiar with this institution. Prophet Mohammed called Abu Bakr as his vizier.¹ Nizamulmulk does not enter into such discussions. His study is on the basis of institutional structure only. To him, the institution existed long before the Prophet.² Like Plato he thinks that the minister is the trustee a shepherd while state is the trust and peoples are the flock.

Political consideration as intimately in Mawardi's concept of vizarat and in that of Nizamulmulk is the same. But the approach radically differs. He makes a theoretical distinction between two types of vizarat,

1. al-ahkam, p. 22, Adab al-Vazir, p. 9

2. Wizarat Nama, pp. 218-220

viz. Vizarat-i-farviz and Vizarat-i-ta'rif.² The viziers prior to the Turkish domination may be said to belong to the office of the Vizarat-i-farviz and the latter viziers, who were actually less effective and little more powerful than ministers with special portfolios. Nizamulmulk recommends some limitations on the viziers yet he believes in no categorization in general and Vizarat-e-ta'rif in particular.²

The position of al-Mana'ili, the Manbalid vizier of Muti'Billah Abu-al-Hasim al-Fazl bin Muqtadi and al-Fazl bi-Amr Allah (334-381 A.H.) Ali bin al-Mussain and Fakhr al-Baulah the ministers of al-Hasim were those whose rise and fall was in the mind of al-Mawardi while compiling his treatises on administrative craft. These viziers were subservient to the will of the Buwayhids in all matters of policy and the mode of their execution.

1. al-Mawardi places Vizier-i-farviz equivalent to the caliph for all practical purposes. In fact, he maintains the continuity with the past conception of historians like Kafi, Mas'udi and Baladhuri who make special reference to those who held both military and executive authority like the Samanids. The Vizier-i-ta'rif of al-Mawardi means the master of nothing but pen only.

2. Siyasat Nama, pp. 29, 30, 35, 36.

They did not act as caliph's alter ego but they were placed as the mediators between the army and the ruler, between the officials and the rulers between subjects and the sovereign. He served orders of appointment of important officers give legal sanction to the co-existence of Suwahid Amirs and an Abbasid's vizier Hawardi considers their appointment as legitimate and confirms the fact that two great powers cannot exist simultaneously unless a clear division of powers and functions is made between the two authorities. In this case, however, the state governed by a dictatorial regime would suffer a clash of power or the military authority would exercise a superior hand. Realising the nominal character of the vizier in this state of affairs. Hawardi recommends the qualities of the person to be appointed on this post. Even a zimmi may be appointed to such an office. Other qualities, however, are those which cannot be excluded in the case of vizier-e-raufiz.

Both al-Hawardi and al-Zamalkulk are unanimous in specifying faithfulness to the monarch as one the prime virtues of the vizier; but he does not ignore

monarch's duties to his vizier.¹ Unlike al-Mawardi Nizamulmulk speaks of no such possibility which may turn a king to hostility towards the vizier.

al-Mawardi on the other hand includes the monarch in the list of the vizier's enemies when the latter exercises excessive powers. As a result of this hostility the authority of the vizier is undermined vis-a-vis and in relation to the subordinate staff never equals.

al-Mawardi, seems to recommend that the vizier should resign as soon as he fails to maintain tranquility. And for that reason he justifies the use of power if necessiated in order to deal with anti-social elements in the days of disturbance.²

As qazi, Mawardi should have been more important of the state of justice in the Abbasid state. He seems overcaution in his emphasis on the administration of justice when he says that the people need nothing but justice or course his concept of justice rests on a

1. Adab-ul-Yazir, pp. 25-27.

2. Adab-ul-Yazir, pp. 3, 13.

more comprehensive, philosophical definition of justice than the mere judicial form of its dispensation yet in this specific sense he is particular enough to elaborate further. Disturbance, according to him may be caused even by the actions and politics of the monarch, corrupt administration, unworthy staff and failure in supervision may also create disorder and chaos among the people. For this vizier should be cautious. He should improve the means of livelihood, protect people against injustice and keep a vigilant eye over the aggressive tendencies of neighbouring states. He should check economic affluences. In the matters of taxation the vizier should avoid over-estimation. The funds of the state should be allocated evitably lest feelings of injustice should be created among those deprived.

It is worth recalling that the sovereign of Nizam's conception is divinely ordained and as such he portkes no blames for any wrong or injustice done to the people. The responsibility devolves on the vizier. On the other hand Mawardi, while giving divine status to the Imam considers him to be wholly responsible for his own actions.

al-Mawardi, believes in mutual understanding between the vizier and the caliph in the matters of executive power. As soon as animity gives place to discord the hostility of the later forever. The condition is slightly different in the case of vizier-i-ta'wiz. So long as the imam acts in conformity with rules and regulations. The vizier's position is strong and the caliph has no right to revoke his orders.¹ Yet he would advise that the vizier should not insist on his own policies or plans and actions if the caliph disagrees. For the caliph is the ruler. If the actions of the imam go wrong the responsibility is entirely on the vizier. Contrarily the king of Nizamluk is completely independent for his actions but the responsibility of his actions devolves not on himself but on the vizier. According to Mawardi, as head of the army the vizier should have the qualities of bravery, zeal, courage, strong will, impressiveness and reflection. He can himself appoint his deputies to lead the army in the campaigns. Both al-Mawardi and

1. Al-shukh, pp. 24, 26

Nizamulmulk believe that the salaries of the soldiers must not be delayed. The military personnel should be given immediate audience. In Nizam's view all nobles hence must be given this privilege.

Mawardi, is of the opinion that the applicant for the post of vizarat is required to fulfil all conditions except pedigree,¹ because it is essential for the Imam only i.e., he should be from amongst Quraish. Nizamulmulk considers it to be one of the essential conditions of the vizier, probably because he intends to make this post hereditary in his family for which vizarat in hereditary succession like the kingship for the kings, becomes primary virtue.² Mawardi believes in his educational qualifications. In the light of Mawardi's recommendations appointment for the post of vizarat is more difficult than acquiring a multi power post like the caliphate. He not only wanted him to fulfil all the conditions which an Imam should have but adds more regulations for the

1. Al-ahkam, p. 22

2. Siyasat Nama, pp. 217-19.

candidate. Religious piety, knowledgability, physical fitness, intelligence, statesmanship, courage should be common in the vizier and the Imam. Nizamulmulk disapproves none of them but tacitly implies. Religious piety in the vizier indicates the same circumstances as had later developed in the time of the Saljuqs. To al-Mawardi religious piety was not essential only because of Carmathian propaganda or Fatimid prominence but for the reasons that Abu Kalijar had embraced the Ismailite faith.¹ Shiite domination on the political landscape and their tutelage posed for al-Mawardi the problem of keeping intact the very fabric of sunni faith and shariat, hence to 'assume' the virtue if one had it not. Probably none of the Abbasid viziers had ever possessed religious piety to that extent, and therefore, hastened the ruin of the Abbasid power.

Military penetration into the root of the administration led al-Mawardi to recommend courage,

1. The Abbasid Caliph was living on the licence of Abu Kalijar than the Buwahyd ruler of Iraq and its adjoining territories.

statemanship, shrewdness and so on as the essential virtues for the vizier. During the time of Turkish domination the caliph and the vizier lived as long as they could please the Turkish army and its officers. The same fear existed under Suwayd and Saljuq tutelage as well. None of the viziers that is Muhallabi and Mussain bin Ali and Fakhr al Daulah who held this office could exercise effective authority on the administration even over the nominee of the Malik-al-muslim, al-Bassassiri, or Amid al-Saghdad of Saljuqs, Hajjaj bin Jafar. The Imam, al-Qaim failed to suppress Bassassiri's rebellion in which he was made prisoner in 1057-58 A.D.

Knowledgeability covers a wide conception of vizier's virtues. He should acquire knowledge of the nature and psychology of the subjects. It would be helpful for his success in the implementation of king's orders.¹

1. ~~Adab-al-Vazier~~, p. 1011-12.

For instance worldly men (ahl-al-duniya) expect monetary support. Farmers and artisans (li-azarati ya-ala-izarati) demand justice and labourers (al-Mihan) gratitude. None of these should become hurdles or means of economic exploitation to achieve any of the vizier's goals. Knowledge of the friends of the king and their psychology of enemies of the state, vizier's own friends and foes and their attitude and of seditious elements, internal or external are the primary elements of the knowledgability in Mawardi's writings.¹ Sources of income, items of expenditure increment in state treasury, causes of the fall in the state finances and possible means to check inflation or deflation must be evident to the vizier.²

The person or a group who at any time may be hostile to the existence and survival of the vizier be eliminated for he may become the cause of downfall of the vizier.³ Thus he clearly recommends that a

1. Ibid., p. 13-18.

2. Ibid., p. 19-23.

3. Ibid., p. 35-38.

Vizier should have some talents for hatching conspiracies without which he cannot survive in his power. Court politics probably had compelled to recommend this virtue for the vizier in his practical life. The vizier al-Musallimah was contemporary to al-Mawardi whose he had witnessed the farmers' rise and fall. The humiliation and the manner in which he was killed had certainly influenced al-Mawardi's approach. Thus whosoever failed in hatching conspiracy, against such persons or groups was either put in jail or treacherously murdered. He recommends that vizier should prepare a clique of his friends which would help him in the days of his trouble.

Excess of anger or affection could influence decisions keeping of words, implementing of threats are also of practical importance. A promise, if it had ever been made, becomes the right of others but as threat to its maker; and it should be avoided, or if made, it must be fulfilled unless a suitable excuse may be advanced for its nonfulfilment. All these recommendations would help him in his practical life.

C O N C L U S I O N

While speaking of the institution of Vizarat in Islam, a distinction must necessarily be made between the vizarat as it existed under the pious caliphs and the vizarat which emerged under the influence of the monarchies of Central Asia. The former is a function, the latter denotes an office. The prophet used to assign various functions of executive nature to his companions depending on their respective abilities. Abubakar acted as chief adviser, Umar was consulted in the affairs of war and Ali was generally entrusted with the 'alam' in the battle fields.. Bilal often looked after the finances. Ali and Muawia were the prophet's scribes. Abubakar has been called the prophet's wazir by the historians and was so regarded by Arabs. These companions held no official designation and were expected to conform in their functioning with the shariat as also to the practices of Arab tribal democracy.

The latter concept of vizarat inevitably emboied the prestige of the supreme executive of the state from the tradition existing in the conquered territories


of Iraq and Ajam. It grew from the political necessity of controlling the vast caliphal domains under the Umayyads and the Abbasids and achieved maturity under the powerful rules of the minor dynasties.

The times when Al-Mawardi and Nizamulmulk Razi wrote, represent the phase of the decline and disintegration of caliphal power and the rise of Turkish states at its expense. The caliph had been reduced to the unenviable position of complete subservience to the Buwayhid faction. Theoretically the caliph was still the supreme head and controller of the state; but virtually the Buwayhids ruled. The emergence of powerful Turkish states converted muslim polity into despotic monarchy wherein the king was all powerful and subject to the dictates of shariat to such extent as the exigencies of the state or the natural propensities of the monarch permitted. The caliph wellaware of his position which was made precarious by the de-facto sovereignty of the Buwayhids and the de-facto authority of the Sultans within their states insisted on eliciting allegiance. On the other hand the Buwayhids and the Sultans who justified their

power through investitures from the caliph maintained the appearance of legality. Thus the de-facto and de-jure natures of sovereignty of the sultans and the caliph had become the main objects of philosophical debate among scholars. The concept of vizarat was bound to be subject to clarification of a universal concept of sovereignty. The understanding of these concepts was therefore crucial to the exposition of the institution of vizarat by Mawardi and Nizamulmulk. Mawardi conceives of the Imam or the caliph as the supreme head of the state who derives his authority from the Islamic law. As representative of God on earth and successor to the pious caliphs he enjoys unquestioned authority over the subjects. In other words he is the ruler of the Islamic state by Divine right. Any violation of his legal authority is usurpation and illegal. All powers exercised by the executives of the state are thus delegated and not inherent. The sovereign of Nizamulmulk is also all powerful and rules by Divine right. But he comes into being not by any provisions of the Islamic law but is created by historical

necessity. Man is basically selfish, unscrupulous and sinful: selfish interest, sinful life and infighting induces anarchy, a condition of war of each against each. There is no one to provide them security or to maintain law and order. In these circumstances God sends upon them a just monarch, who reforms them, manages the affairs of the state, protects them from aggression; and when once again the people commit sin, God removes the king, anarchy prevails and so the cycle goes on. Such a sovereign is in no sense responsible to the people or to any other authority. He is answerable only to God alone. Thus Nizamulmulk's sovereign is very much like of Leviathan of Hobbes, in fact far more powerful.

The two concepts of sovereignty, one representing the de jure position of the Imam and the other the de-facto authority of the sultans, though similar, have very different implications when applied to the power structure of the state. From this, these authors form the characteristic features of vizarat. Thus Mawardi's vizier is the supreme executive authority



whose powers are derived from the will of the sovereign: consequently a vizier is either the plenipotentiary of the Imam enjoying unquestioned authority over all subjects of deliberation, is responsible to know one except the sovereign himself who alone formulates the policies for the vizier. This kind of vizarat is called by Mawardi is vizarat-i-ta'wiz. When the powers of the vizier are restricted to the execution of administrative orders by the Imam, the vizier's deliberative functions are reduced to the nominal. This kind of vizarat is, what Mawardi calls as vizarat-i-ta'fiz: A vizier or a noble acting independently without proper mandate from the Imam is usurper and is called amir bil istila. This obviously has reference to the Governors as well as the sultans whose authority he regarded as arbitrary and usurpation. Since, however, their de-facto authority is regularised by subsequent bestowal of the Imam's investiture. The usurpers (viz. the Buwayhids and the Seljuqs) are recognised as amirs.

Nizamulmulk' makes no such distinction. The vizier is represented as the alterego of the king; and as such embibes from him the supreme authority of monarch by Divine right. As the most powerful single person after the king, he administers all the departments of the state without exception, formulates policies, negotiates treaties, controls the military, declares war, maintains accounts of finance, governs the resources, appoints and dismisses officials. However, faithfulness to the king, welfare of the state, enforcement of justice, protection of the state and the maintenance of law and order are always the prime considerations of the vizier.

In other words, Nizamulmulk's vizier is not only the supreme executive but also exercises the functions of legislative and the judiciary on behalf of the king. This position does not place him in opposition to the established law of the shariat. As follower of Islam, he is subject to the religious law and all his legislative deliberations conform to it. The same applies to his judicial powers. He is the highest appellate authority but next to the king.

As against this Mawardi's vizier-i-ta'wiz is governed strictly by the ecclesiastical code. He creates no laws but enforces the law that exists in principle in the scriptures or codified by the accepted doctors of Islamic jurisprudence. Even the Imam has no say in this matter. Interpretation and enforcement of the law is the exclusive privilege of the qazi Mawardi. In matters of finance the vizier can even override the will of the sovereign, should the latter be found to be deviating from the dictates of Islamic injunctions. Thus Mawardi's vizier appears to be more powerful than that of Nizamulmulk Iqbal. In effect, however, he is inferior to the former in so far as he has little option beyond what is laid down in the code of sharia.

The responsibilities as well as the powers of the vizier are both heavy and of heterogeneous character: this makes him susceptible to the temptation of becoming absolute and disloyal to the king. The love of specie and craving for power can make him a prey to factionalism and create in him the tendency towards oppression. It is imperative therefore that he is by nature and training virtuous. Virtue is the child

of knowledge and religiosity. The vizier should himself be a learned man and good muslim. This element is common to both Mawardi and Nizam. However, Nizam's concept of virtue is much more than mere philosophical costruction as in Mawardi. It pre-supposes a pragmatic attitude that is expressed in his being kind hearted, pious and loyal to the monarch. Large heartedness gives him the moral courage, necessary to withstand intrigue and opposition. In times of scarcity he foregoes remittance of taxes by the poor. He forgives personal offence and constantly endeavours to bring prosperity to the people. Piety makes him God-fearing and loyalty to the king keeps the enemy in check. But, since virtue is a rare commodity having to do more with heredity than training, Nizam shows a special prejudice for high birth as one of chief qualifications of a vizier.

He recommends that vizier should be selected from amongst princess and nobles of successively high percentage. High mindedness, generosity and knowledgibility come naturally to the high born. It is possible, however, that Nizam's emphasise

on this aspect was motivated by the desire of justifying his own existence as in Iranian in the Saljuq court.

Such considerations are alien to Mawardi. In his opinion even a zimmī may be appointed to the high office of vizarate. This is the basic difference between him and Nizamulmulk on the question of human nature. A muslim is a muslim and a true muslim cannot be but virtuous. This view obviously takes into consideration the Islamic democratic idealism. However being virtuous by no means precludes the adoption of oppressive methods for the suppression of anti-social elements. The basic goodness of human nature doesnot imply the absence of evil or sin. Mawardi was the chief qazi. Having been concerned with dealing with crime and punishment, he lays special emphasis on the adoption of oppressive methods. Since maintenance of law and order is the responsibility of Imam, he considers him to be wholly responsible for breach of the people's peace.

To sum up the concept of vizarat in Mawardi and Nizamulmulk represent two basically different political situations. For that reason, whereas

their actual concepts confirm to the universal idea
of powerful vizarat as characteristic to monarchies.
they differ in their approach. Alizamalk is the
pragmatist and Nawardi a jurist.

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A P P A N D I X - I

Chronological Table of the Abbasid Caliphs

1. Abul Abbas Saffah	749-54 A.D.
2. Abu Ja'far al-Mansur	754-75 "
3. al-Muhammad	775-85 "
4. al-Muhammad	785-86 "
5. Marun al-Muwahhid	786-809 "
6. al-Amin	808-13 "
7. al-Muhamun	808-30 "
8. al-Mu'tasim	830-42 "
9. al-Wasiq Billah	842-47 "
10. al-Mutawakkil	847-61 "
11. al-Muntasir Billah	861-62 "
12. al-Musta'in	862-66 "
13. al-Mu'tazz Billah	866-69 "
14. al-Muhtadi Billah	869-70 "
15. al-Mu'tamid	870-92 "
16. al-Mu'tazid	892-902 "
17. al-Muqtafi	902-07 "
18. al-Muqtadir	907-32 "
19. al-Jahir	932-34 "
20. al-Muzi Billah	934-41 "
21. al-Mutayfi	941-45 "
22. al-Mustayfi	945-46 "
23. al-Muti 'Billah	946-74 "
24. al-Fa'1	974-99 "
25. al-Jadir	999-1031 "

26. al-Jaim	1031-75	A.D.
27. al-Muqtadi	1075-94	"
28. al-Mustazhir	1094-1118	"
29. al-Mustarshid	1118-34	"
30. al-Rashid	1134-35	"
31. al-Muqtafi	1135-60	"
32. al-Mustanjidillah	1160-61	"
33. al-Mustazi	1161-80	"
34. al-Nasir	1180-1225	"
35. al-Zahir	1225-26	"
36. al-Mustansirillah	1226-42	"
37. al-Musta'isimillah	1242-58	"

A P P E N D I X - II

List of the Viziers of Abbasid Period, prepared on the basis of Tabari's Jahshiyari, Ta'atun & Isha'ir.

~~Caliphs~~~~Viziers~~

al-Saffah

Harris bin Salaman

al-Mahdi

Yaqub bin Dawud
Abu Saleh

al-Hadi

al-Habbal bin Yunus
Ibrahim bin Dakwan
Yahya bin Khalid Barmak

Harun-al-Rashid

Yahya bin Khalid Barmak
Jafar bin Yahya with Fazl
Fazl bin Habbal

al-Amin

Fazl bin Habbal

al-Mamun

al-Fazl bin al-Sahal
Hasan bin Sahal
Ahmad bin Yusuf bin Asim
Abu Isahak bin Isahak
Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Yazdaj

al-Mutassim

al-Fazl bin Marwan
Ahmad bin Umar
Fazl bin Marwan
Muhammad bin Abdul
Malik al-Siyat

al-Mu'isq

Muhammad al-Siyat

al-Mutawakkil

Abu Jafar Muhammad al-Jarjari
Abdullah bin Yahya bin
Khaqan

al-Muntasir Billah

Ahmad bin al-Khasib

al-Mustain

Abu Saleh Muhammad bin Yazdaj

al-Mutazz Billah

Abul Fazl Jafar al-Askafi
Abu Musa bin Isa bin
Farkhanshah
Abu Jafar Ahmad bin Israil
Muhammad al-Askafi

al-Muhtadi

Sulaiman bin Wahhab

al-Mutamid

Hasan bin Yahya bin Khaqan
Hasan bin Mukhlid

Abu Saqr Ismail bin
 Sulbul (Abu Saqr & Wahhab
 were changed term by
 term several times).
 Ahmad bin Saleh bin Shairazad
 Usaidullah bin Sulaiman
 bin Wahhab

al-Mutazid
 Usaidullah bin Sulaiman
 al-Yasim bin Usaidullah

al-Muqtafi
 Usaidullah bin Muhammad
 al-Abbas bin al-Hasan

al-Muqtadir
 al-Abbas
 Ibnul Furat
 al-Khazani Abu Ali
 Muhammad bin Usaidullah Ishaq
 Ali Isa bin al-Jarrah
 Hamid bin al-Abbas
 Usaidullah bin Ahmad Abu
 Abbas
 al-Zunji
 Sulaiman bin Hasan bin
 Mukhlid
 Ibnul Muqlah
 al-Kasuzani (Ibnul Muqlah
 and Ibnul Furat were often
 changed one by one).
 Husain bin al-Yasim al-
 Wahhab
 Jafar bin Furat

al-Jasir
 Ibnul Muqlah
 Sulaiman bin al-Wahhab

al-Kazi Billah
 Ibnul Muqlah
 Isa bin Dawud bin al-Jarrah
 Abu Jafar Muhammad al-Yasim
 al-Karkhi
 Fazl bin Jafar bin Furat
 (purchased ministry from
 Ibnul Muqlah)

al-Mustaqfi
 Sulaiman
 Abu al-Bir Ahmad bin
 Muhammad bin Hasan
 Abu Usaidullah al-Saridi
 Muhammad Ibnul Muqlah
 (Saridi and Karkhi were
 replaced one by one
 several times).

al-Mustaqfi
 al-Samari Abu Faraj
 Muhammad bin Ali

al-Muti Sillah	Not known (perhaps al-Muhallabi
al-fai	al-Muhallabi
al-jadir	al-Muhallabi (others not known)
al-jasim	al-Muslaimah Ibnul Jahir Fakhr al-Daulah Ibnul Jahir
al-Muqtadi	Fakhr al-Daulah Amid al-Daulah bin Fakhr Musain al-Hamedani
al-Mustazhir	Abul Jasim Ali bin Fakhr bin Jahir Abul Hasan Hibloctallah bin Mohammad bin Muttalib
al-Mustarshid	Abu Ali al-Nasir Abul Jasim Ali al-Nasir Ahmad Abu Nasr bin Nizamulmulk Abu Sharwan bin Khalid
al-Mushid	Mohammad Ibnul Bidjah
al-Muqtafi	al-Zaimi Nizamuddin Ahmad Abu Nasr al-Muzaffar bin Jahir Mutami al-Daulah Aun al-Din Abu Muzaffar
al-Mustanjid Sillah	Aun al-Din Abu Muzaffar Izz-al-Din Sharifuddin Abu Jafar
al-Mustaxi	Azd-al-Din Jahiruddin Abu Bakr bin al-Attar
al-Nasir	Ibnul Attar Jalaluddin Abu Muzaffar bin Usaidullah Muizz-al-Din Said bin Ali bin Hadidah Muiz-al-Din al-Jasab Sayyid Nasir-al-Din Nasir bin Khindi (Khich) Muiz-al-Din al-Jami (Jhich)
al-zahir	al-Jami (alone)
al-Mustansir Sillah	al-Jami Abul Azhar al-Muqidi

al-Mustasim Billah

**Nasiruddin Ahmad
al-quami (again)
(The conspirator against
the caliph in favour of
Mongols.)**